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MULTIPLIERS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF
CAPITAL DEPRECIATION?*
Luís F. Costa**
In static general equilibrium models considering imperfectly competitive goods markets, the
effectiveness of fiscal policy to stir output is shown to be greater than in the walrasian case.
However, labour the only input in these models. Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model
allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock in the fiscal policy transmission
mechanism. I demonstrate the results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen and
on the output definition. Using plausible numerical values the multiplier is larger in the walrasian
case for small initial government purchases, and smaller for intermediate values.
1. INTRODUCTION
IN STATIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS considering imperfectly competitive goods
markets, the effectiveness of fiscal policy to stir output is shown to be greater than in
the walrasian case. This line of research begins with the seminal papers of Dixon
(1987), Mankiw (1988) , and Startz (1989) (henceforth DMS), and includes more
recent articles such as Dixon and Lawler (1996) and Reinhorn (1998). However,
labour is considered to be the only input in these models, ignoring the implications of
the existence of investment.
 Hairault and Portier (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), inter alia,
introduced imperfect competition in dynamic general equilibrium models, where
capital accumulation is explicitly considered. However, these articles are mainly
focused on the business cycles features of imperfectly competitive economies. The
effects of capital depreciation on the steady-state (gross) output multiplier are not
studied there. Considering GDP is the output measure more commonly used in
empirical studies and in policy design, the above-mentioned multiplier is an important
measure of fiscal policy effectiveness.
Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state
role of optimal capital stock in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. This can be
seen as a dynamic extension of the models in the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)
tradition. In section 2, the optimal intertemporal behaviour for agents is derived. The
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microeconomic equations are put together, the model is closed, and the long-run
equilibrium is derived in Section 3. In section 4, I derive the static fiscal output
multiplier and analyse it under several assumptions about the initial steady state.
Economic interpretation and comparison with the DMS framework are done in section
5, using some numerical simulations. Section 6 analyses the net output multiplier and
section 7 introduces free entry. Section 8 concludes.
I demonstrate results depend strongly both on the set of parameter values chosen
and on the output definition. Using plausible numerical values the multiplier is larger
in the walrasian case for small initial government purchases, and smaller for
intermediate values.
2. THE MODEL
This model represents an artificial closed economy composed of three groups of
agents: one representative household, n Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
producers, and the government. I assume there is no uncertainty, agents are infinitely
living, and money does not exist. I use very standard assumptions and specific
functional forms, so I will not be exhaustive in the model description.
2.1. The representative household
This agent maximises an additively separable intertemporal utility function,
depending on an aggregate consumption index and labour supply:


















where Ct is the aggregate consumption index, Nt the labour supply, 0<β<1 is the
discount factor, 1/(1-γ) with γ≤1 gives us the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption (EISC), and 1/(µ-1) with µ≥1 gives us the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in labour supply (EISL). The consumption index is a CES function of the
quantities consumed for n goods, and there is no love for variety1:























. ,  .
Cj,t is the consumption of good j and σ>1 is the reciprocal of the elasticity of
substitution between goods. The appropriate cost-of-living index, Pt, is also a CES
                                                
1 The effects of love for variety on the multiplier are studied in Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996).
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function of all the pj,t, the individual prices, and it is normalised to unity. The budget
constraint expressed in terms of aggregate consumption good is given by:
(3.) 1 1 1
1
+ + + = + +− −
=
∑r B w N B p C Tt t t t t t j t j t
j
n
t1 6. . ., ,π  ,
where Bt is a government real bond designated in aggregate consumption held by the
household at the end of period t, rt is the real interest rate paid on bonds held until the
end of period t, wt is the real wage rate, πτ total real profit income, and Tt is a real
lump-sum tax. For similar models in open economy see, inter alia, Costa (1998b) and
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Behavioural equations (consumption Euler equation,
demand for goods, and labour supply) are exactly the same as in the above-mentioned
articles. Since I am interested in the steady state analysis, I present them in appendix
A.
2.2. Government
Government purchases a basket of the n goods, represented by Gt, with identical
preferences to the household. Since the household is infinitely living ricardian
equivalence holds, the only source to finance government spending is the lump-sum
tax on the household, balancing the budget overtime: Gt=Tt.
2.3. Firms
Firm j (j=1, ..., n) maximises a stream of discounted cash flows:
(4.) max . , . .
, , ,, ,
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where πj,t represents its cash flow, qj,t its output, Nj,t its labour demand, and Ij,t its
gross investment in the aggregate capital good. I assume the technology to produce the
capital good uses no labour and it is identical to the household’s sub-utility function
given by (2.).2 The firm’s discount factor given by a rt s
t
s= += −Π 1 11 1/ ( ) . Firm j uses the




At is total factor productivity, Kj,t is the capital stock owned by this firm at the end of
period t, and 0<ψ≤1. Capital is accumulated according to: K K Ij t j t j t, , ,.= − +−1 1δ1 6 ,
where δ is a constant depreciation rate.
                                                
2 I also assume pj,t is the opportunity cost of not selling a unit of good j, therefore the aggregate price
index for the capital stock is the same as the consumption cost-of-living index, i.e., is equal to unity.
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The number of firms, n, is assumed to be sufficiently big to avoid the existence of
feedback effects as it happens in d’Aspremont et al. (1989a), Costa (1998a) , and








where Qt=Ct+It+Gt is the aggregate demand, and I It j
n
j t= =Σ 1 , . Assuming the
equilibrium is symmetric, pj,t=Pt=1, and we obtain a Lerner index given by m=1/σ,
representing the market power of the individual firm. Again, see appendix A for
equations giving us the supply of good j, and the demands for labour and investment,
in its dynamic forms.
3. LONG-RUN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
To close the model, an aggregate output definition is needed:








This definition corresponds to gross output, i.e., GDP. In section 6 this assumption
is relaxed. It follows from (6.) and from the market clearing condition in all markets,
qj,t=Dj,t for all j=1, ..., n, that aggregate demand equals aggregate output: Qt=Yt. We
also need an aggregate capital stock definition given by: K Kt j
n
j t= =Σ 1 , .
3.1. Steady state
Assuming the economy can reach a zero-growth steady state, the conditions
defining it are given by the three dynamic equations in the model: the consumption
Euler equation, the capital accumulation equation, and the optimal capitalistic
intensity (kt=Kt/Nt+1). Therefore, these equations can be written as follow, where
variables with asterisks represent their steady-state equilibrium values:
(7.) r* = −1 β
β
 ;
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Equation (7.) represents the condition equalising the real interest rate to the
household’s discount rate, imposing zero growth in consumption. The zero net-
investment condition necessary for a stationary capital stock is given by (8.). Finally,
the optimal input allocation is represented by (9.). Reducing the steady-state system to
three equations in Y* (or Q*), C* and I*, we obtain:
(10.) (a) Y C I G* * * *= + +    ,    (b) Y a z Ca a* *. .= 0
1 2    ,    (c) I b z Cb
b* *. .= 0
1 2  ,
where z=1/(1-m) is an alternative market power measure,3 a1=1+b1<0, b1=-
µ.[ψ.(µ−1)]<0, a2=b2=-(1-γ)/(µ−1)<0, and a0,b0>0 are functions of the fundamental
parameters.
4. STATIC FISCAL MULTIPLIER
The multiplier can be derived using a first-order Taylor approximation around the
initial steady state. Since there is no closed-form solution to (10.),4 the implicit
function theorem is used to derive the multiplier: h=1+CG+IG, where XR=dX
*/dR*,


































where e=C*/Y*∈(0,1] is the consumption share, and s=e+I*/G*∈(0,1] is the private
expenditure share in aggregate demand. Using these results, the following reduced














We can notice this multiplier is strictly positive for finite values of EISC. Furthermore,
it decreases with both shares e and s.
                                                
3 This measure is equal to the ratio of price to the marginal cost.
4 A closed-form solution exists in the special case where G*=0.
MULTIPLIERS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 6
6
4.1. The government shut-down fallacy
First, let us assume G*=0 (or s=1) in the initial steady state. Considering
government expenditure is pure waste, this is the government expenditure level
maximising household’s utility.5 In this case, we may state:
PROPOSITION 1: If government expenditure is zero (government shut down) in the
initial steady state, then the static fiscal multiplier is larger under perfect competition
than in the monopolistic case.
PROOF: First, let us express consumption share as a function of government
purchases and the mark-up, e=e(G*,z). It is easy to demonstrate that (de/dz)|s=1=(1-
e)/z>0, i.e., the consumption share in aggregate demand increases with the mark-up.
Consequently, a bias towards consumption exists in the monopolistic equilibrium
(z>1), when compared with the walrasian case (z=1), i.e., e(0,z)>e(0,1), for all z>1.




















µ γ1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6  ,
provided EISC and EISL are finite. Q.E.D.
This result contradicts the findings of the DMS articles, and also other models
considering labour to be the only input used in production as it happens in Costa
(1998a) and Costa (1998b), inter alia. Thus, is the absence of capital in the production
function a necessary condition to observe a larger fiscal multiplier under imperfect
competition than in the walrasian case?
4.2. The general case
In general, we cannot ignore the role of the government share in aggregate demand
(1-s), in the multiplier. Therefore, imperfect competition affects the multiplier to the
extent it affects e(G*,z) and 1-s(G*,z). Considering Yz, Iz and Cz (under certain
conditions) are negative, i.e., the output, investment and consumption levels decrease








= − − >1 6 1 6. *  .
                                                
5 For a recent article analysing the relationship between optimal fiscal policy and the multiplier, within
the DMS framework, see Reinhorn (1998).
6 See appendix B for reduced forms and necessary condition.
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Hence, if we could prove de/dz>0 holds for all s∈[0,1), the multiplier would be
strictly decreasing in the mark-up. However, a higher monopoly degree reduces both
consumption and output, and the way it affects the consumption share depends on the
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When s=1, it is easy to see that x0>0. However, for s∈(0,1), x0 implies G*/I* <
[ψ.(µ−γ)]/[µ.(1−ψ)+ψ] must hold. Since I cannot guarantee this condition holds even
for plausible sets of parameters, further investigation has to be done. Considering
de/dz does not have an unambiguous sign holding for all the range of the parameters, a
simplifying assumption as to be made. First, let us write this expression as:
de/dz=e.C*.(Cz-e.Yz).
ASSUMPTION 1: There exists a unique finite number G0≥0, such that, for a given
value for z and for G*=G0, de/dz=0, i.e., Cz/Yz=e.
Hence, if assumption 1 holds, then de/dz is positive in the first interval7 and
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1 6  .
For G*∈[0,G0), we are clearly in case I. However, I cannot demonstrate what happens
for G*>G0 without further information. Thus, another assumption is needed:
ASSUMPTION 2: There exist two finite numbers, GA,GB≥0 and GA≤GB, such that they
are the only existing feasible solutions for the equation ∂h/∂z=0.
                                                
7 Remember I demonstrated it was positive for s=1.
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If assumption 2 holds, three intervals for G* that generate different signs for dh/dz
can be found: (i) for G*∈[0,GA), dh/dz is negative since [0,G0)⊂[0,GA) and it is
negative in the first of these intervals; (ii) for G*∈(GA,GB), dh/dz is positive; (iii) for
G*∈(GB,+∞), dh/dz is negative. In next section I try to assess the how realistic the two
assumptions are and how important the switching points GA and GB can be to explain
the role of imperfect competition in the multiplier mechanism.
5. SIMULATION AND INTERPRETATION
5.1. Simulation
Set A in Table I, a plausible set of parameter values, is used to generate numerical
values for the multiplier and its components. The value for β yields a 5% per period
discount rate (and steady state real interest rate), γ implies EISC=0.75, and σ
determines a Lerner index of 0.17. All these values were taken from Sutherland
(1996). The value for δ assumes a forty-period maximum lifetime for the capital
stock. This value was taken from Hairault and Portier (1993). The value for ψ
produces a 62.5% labour share in total income, which is lower than the 70% proposed
in Hairault and Portier (1993), but is consistent with most values used in the real
business cycles literature.8 The value for µ generates EISL=0.67< EISC, which is
generally accepted as a stylised fact. The value for ξ gives rise to an employment level
equal to 0.33, given all the other values and a government consumption share equal to
0.20. This last value was taken from Baxter (1995).
[Insert Table I here]
Functions de/dz (left-hand side) and dh/dz (right-hand side) are plotted in Figure 1,
using set A.9 For this simulation GA corresponds to 1-s=0.22, and GB corresponds to
1-s=0.87. According to OECD (1976-1996), the average share of government
expenditure in goods and services in the GDP for the period 1974-94, a proxy for 1-s,
varied between 0.098 (Japan) and 0.271 (Sweden), in a sample of 25 countries. Given
this fact, most interesting cases can be found within an interval for witch GA sits,
roughly, in the middle. Hence, given the simulations made, assumptions 1 and 2 are
likely to hold for plausible sets of parameter values.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
                                                
8 See, inter alia, Baxter (1995) , 58%, and Kydland and Prescott (1982), 64%.
9 Similar pictures were obtained for other plausible sets of parameter values.
MULTIPLIERS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 9
9
5.2. Economic interpretation for the switching points
5.2.1. Very small values of G*
For G*∈[0,G0), case I is the relevant one. Figure 2 illustrates the initial general
equilibrium for the special case G*=0, for which fiscal policy maximises household’s
welfare. The household’s maximisation problem is presented the (N*,C*) space (a),
and U are the indifference curves, w the wage rates, BC the budget constraints, and M
refers to the monopolistic equilibrium and W to the walrasian one. The figure in the
(I*,C*) space (b) represents the macroeconomic equilibrium for this special case where
Y*=C*+I*. There are two explanations for the existence of a bias towards consumption
in the monopolistic equilibrium (eM>eW), in this case: (i) due to the existence of pure
profits in the monopolistic case, i.e., π M Mr K
* * *.> , the household has an extra source of
permanent income and, consequently, it can afford future consumption without saving
such a big proportion of its income; (ii) the other effect comes from a lower real wage
under imperfect competition10 that makes labour cheaper relatively to capital,11
lowering the optimal capital level in the monopolistic case when compared with the
competitive one. Thus, the crowding-out effect of public expenditure in
consumption12 is proportionally larger under imperfect competition, and the positive
effects on output and investment are smaller.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
5.2.2. Small values for G*
For G*∈(G0,GA), more government expenditure reduces e. However, this change is
very small and e is still very high. Also, 1-s, government’s share in aggregate demand,
is still too small to off-set the consumption crowding out effect. Here, case II is the
relevant one.
5.2.3. Intermediate values for G*
Let Figure 3 be used to represent what happens when G*∈(GA,GB). Here, 1-s is
more important now. Nevertheless, consumption crowding out is still the main
mechanism to explain the differences in the multipliers under different mark-up
levels. We can see, on (b), that e/s is now larger in the walrasian case, i.e., OW is
                                                
10 Inefficiency under imperfect competition implies a lower consumption level, expanding labour
supply, and a reduction in labour demand, when compared with the walrasian case.
11 Remember the interest rate was assumed to be fixed in order to have a zero growth steady state.
12 Notice it is partial for finite elasticities of intertemporal substitution, as we can see in (11.) (a).
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steeper than OM. Furthermore, due to efficient allocation, 1-s is smaller in the
walrasian case. Thus, e=(s.e)/s is larger in the competitive case. Consequently, given
the bias towards investment in the monopolistic case, a permanent increase in lump-
sum taxes as a proportionally smaller negative impact than in the walrasian case.13
This corresponds to case III.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
5.2.4. Large values for G*
For G*>GB we are in case II again, but for different economic reasons. Now, e is
small, due to increasing shares of both government consumption and investment,14
and these last two components dominate what happens to aggregate demand (and
output). Considering extra units of capital are used more efficiently in the competitive
case, the multiplier is larger there than under monopolistic competition. Of course
there is a value for G* such that N* equals the time endowment, and no more capacity
can be added. But even before that point, we expect the multiplier to decrease with G*,
if consumption of goods and leisure is so low that the optimal response to higher taxes
is to reduce labour supply. Considering the estimates for GB already imply such a high
value for 1-s,15 we will concentrate in the range G*∈[0,GB).
5.3. Comparing with the DMS framework
As it can be seen in Dixon (1987), referring to the DMS framework:
“(...) the government expenditure multiplier is in a very precise sense «Walrasian» in this
model. By this we mean that the mechanisms underlying the Walrasian multiplier are the same
with imperfect competition. There will be crowding out, and the multiplier has the Walrasian
                                                
13 A similar consumption-led mechanism, due to the existence of distortionary taxation on labour
income, can be observed in Torregrosa (1998). There, despite the fact that labour is the only input, the
multiplier may be negative.























2 7 1 61  ,
and assuming EISC>EISL, I cannot guarantee C
*>I*, a sufficient condition for crowding out to exist. For
large values of I* and small values of C*, the expression may well be positive. Obviously, I do not
advocate this to be a realistic assumption.
15 I was not able to generate values inferior to 0.80, for plausible features of the initial steady state.
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value as its lower bound, is strictly less than unity, and strictly increasing in the degree of
monopoly.”16
The model here presented shares the crowding-out feature for consumption, even if
the same does not apply for investment. The second characteristic, “being less than
unity”, does not hold in general, but I expect it to hold for plausible calibrations.17
Finally, my investigation clearly contradicts the possibility of extending the third
property - a multiplier “strictly increasing in the degree of monopoly” - to a model
where labour is not the sole input. In order to evaluate how robust these results are,
numerical values for GA and GB were generated, modifying the values for key
parameters in the benchmark set (set A). The outcomes are shown in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The changes in γ were made to produce values for EISC equal to 1 (γ=0), and 1.25
(γ=1/5). When ψ=0.55 the labour share in total income is 0.46, and for ψ=0.95 is
equal to 0.79. The parameter σ determines the mark-up level, z, equal to 1 (σ=+∞, i.e.,
perfect competition), or equal to 1.4 (σ=3.5). Finally, for µ=2.33 EISL=EISC=0.75, and
for µ=2.2 EISL=0.83>EISC=0.75. We can notice all the values for GA generate
government shares in aggregate demand (1-s) very similar to those observed in the
OECD countries. Only for ψ=0.55 the model generates a value of GA low enough to
generate a larger multiplier under imperfect competition for all the countries in the
sample.
We can observe 1-s(GA) is highly sensitive to changes in the parameters, especially
γ, ψ and σ. A larger value for one of these parameters generates a lower value for GA.
In the limit, the DMS framework can be seen as a special case of this model where
ψ=1, i.e., labour is the only input, and γ=1, i.e., present and future consumption are
perfect substitutes. Also, it seems plausible that the efficiency gains from reducing the
mark-up increase with the degree of imperfect competition in the initial steady state.18
Apparently, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in labour supply, and its
relationship with its homologous in consumption, does not play an essential role
determining the position of GA.
Thus, a second set of parameters was used, set B in Table I, keeping the main
features of the benchmark initial steady state. The main differences are an elasticity of
                                                
16 Op. cit. pp. 135.
17 For set A, 1-s=0.87 would be needed in order to generate a multiplier bigger than unity.
18 A similar effect for the free-entry multipliers was noticed in Costa (1998a) and Costa (1998b).
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intertemporal substitution in consumption equal to unity, a larger mark-up level
(z=1.4),19 and a slightly larger labour share in total income (0.643). Set B, generated 1-
s(GA)=0.09, hence including all the countries in the 1992 sample in the interval
(GA,GB), compared with only five countries meeting the same criterion in set A.
Finally, the proportional difference between the monopolistic and the walrasian
multipliers, η(G*,z)=h(G*,z)/h(G*,1)-1 was plotted in Figure 4, using the two sets.
Three main characteristics can be observed: (i) the smaller value of G* for which η=0
(approximately equal to GA) is 1.6 times larger for set A; (ii) the maximum value for
the η(.) function is 3.4 bigger in set B; (iii) the value for η is always larger for set B.
Therefore, any conclusion drawn about the importance of imperfect competition for
the long-run effectiveness of fiscal policy depends decisively upon the parameter
values chosen for the artificial economy. If we intend to simulate the features of a
specific real economy, special attention has to be paid to the estimates for the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, labour elasticity in the
production function (i.e., z times the labour share in total income), the mark-up level
in the economy, and the share of government purchases in aggregate demand.
Consequently, the DMS conclusion that fiscal policy is more effective on output under
imperfect competition does not hold in general when the model is extended
introducing capital as an input.
6. NET OUTPUT
Let us use now a different definition for output, net of capital depreciation, instead
of (6.):20
(14.) y Y Kt t t= − −δ . 1  .
In this case, the steady-state equilibrium is given by y*=C*+G*. The net-output



























PROPOSITION 2: Under the normal assumptions, the net output multiplier is strictly
increasing in the monopoly degree.
                                                
19 See Hairault and Portier (1993) for a discussion about estimates for z in the US economy.
20 This definition corresponds to NNP.
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PROOF: First, we know that eN(G
*,z)=1-G*/y(G*,z). For a given level of government
consumption G*, eN varies with the mark-up in the same direction that y
* does it.
Using the equilibrium equation, we recognise that yz=Cz. Thus, as long as C
* decreases
with the mark-up level, so does y* and consequently eN. Since hN is strictly decreasing
in eN for finite values of EISC and EISL, and eN is decreasing in z, the net output
multiplier increases with z. Q.E.D.
Hence, if we use this output definition, our findings corroborate the DMS
conclusions about the monotonicity of the multiplier.
7. ENTRY
Pure profits play a large role in the explanation why the gross output multiplier is
non-monotonic in the market power degree. Thus, let us assume firms are free to entry
or leave the market at no cost in order to eliminate pure profits, i.e., in the long run
cash flows have to equal interest income: πj*=r*.Kj*. In this case, a fixed cost has to be
introduced to generate a finite number of firms21. One alternative is to consider a
lump-sum tax, τ, paid by each firm22. If government purchases are still an exogenous
variable, then government sets taxes paid by the household in the steady state
according to T*=G*-n.τ. When G* is larger, aggregate demand is larger and the number
of firms is also larger. Pure profits disappear, but households pay less taxes because
corporate tax revenue is bigger due to entry. Since households take both taxes and
cash flows as exogenous variables, consumption behaviour is not affected and
conclusions are exactly the same.
The other alternative is to consider a fixed cost with technological origin. Consider
the following production function instead23: q A N Nj t t j t j t, , ,. .+ = −
−Φ ψ ψ1
1 . The steady-state
equilibrium system given by (10.) is no longer valid. Now, equations (10.) (a) and (c)
are the same, but equation (b) has been affected by the overhead mix of inputs and (d)
gives us the zero-profit condition:
(16.) (b) Y a z C na
a* * *. . .= −0
1 2 Φ    ,    (d) n z Q* *( ). /= −1 Φ  .
Using the same procedures, the fiscal multiplier obtained is:
                                                
21 Of course this cannot apply to the walrasian case.
22 E.g., a license.
23 This functional form is only valid for qi,j≥0.

















where i=s-e=1/b is the share of investment in aggregate demand, and it is constant due
to the constant capital-output ratio in this model. Imperfect competition only affects
the multiplier via consumption share. Since pure profits were eliminated by entry,
there are no reasons for a bias towards consumption to exist under imperfect
competition. Thus, it is easy to show that the consumption share decreases with the































Monopolistic and walrasian multipliers are equal under the government shut-down
assumption because e=1-i in both cases, and imperfect competition generates a larger
multiplier when s is different from unity. A similar picture is obtained for the net-
output multiplier.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this article I present a zero-growth steady-state model for a closed economy,
considering capital accumulation. This model can be considered as an intertemporally
founded extension of the static framework in the Dixon (1987),  Mankiw (1988), and
Startz (1989) (DMS) tradition.
The role of imperfect competition in the size of the static fiscal (output) multiplier
of government purchases was analysed. The “optimal” fiscal policy, i.e., the one that
maximises the representative household’s utility, corresponds to zero government
purchases. In this case, it can be unambiguously shown that imperfect competition
produces a smaller multiplier since it introduces a bias towards consumption that
amplifies the crowding out effect of government expenditure. This is exactly the
opposite to the DMS conclusions.
However, I cannot demonstrate this proposition (or the opposite) holds in general.
For plausible parameter values I found two switching points for the multiplier’s
derivative with respect to mark-up. For small values of government consumption the
multiplier is larger in the walrasian case, and for intermediate values the opposite
happens. Consumption crowding out is the main mechanism explaining the
differences. For (implausibly) large values of government expenditure the walrasian
case overtakes the monopolistic one due to more efficient usage of investment.
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Also, I showed the first switching point is very sensitive to changes in the key
parameters, namely labour elasticity in the production function, elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption, and the degree of market power. We
concluded it is not possible to defend a priori neither the DMS results nor the
opposite for this extended model.
Finally, it was demonstrated that the multiplier is strictly increasing in the
monopoly degree when we use net instead of gross output and it is non-drecreasing
when firms are free to entry or leave the market. In both cases, the DMS results hold.
University of York and ISEG, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
APPENDIX A
The behavioural equations are:
(A.1.) C r Ct t t+ −= +1
1
11β γ. .1 6

















(A.4.) G Tt t=
(A.5.) G p
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Equation (A.1.) is the consumption Euler equation, (A.2.) is the labour supply and
(A.3.) is the household’s demand for good j. (A.4.) represents the government budget
constraint and (A.5.) its demand for good j. Equation (A.6.) stands for firm j’s the
optimal capitalistic intensity, (A.7.) its demand for labour, (A.8.) its demand for good
i, and (A.9.) its gross investment. Equation (A.10.) is the market demand for labour.
APPENDIX B
The derivatives of consumption, investment and output with respect to the mark-up




s ez = − −







µ ψ µ1 6 1 6 1 6  ,
which is negative if total consumption share in aggregate demand, 1-s+e is larger than
ψ.µ/(µ−1). This condition held for all the simulations made;
I
h I
ez = − −




























γ ψ1 6 1 6
1 6
1 6  .
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TABLES
TABLE I
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THE PARAMETERS
Set β γ δ ψ µ σ ξ A* n
A 1/1.05 -1/3 0.025 0.75 2.5 6 19.10 1 100
B 1/1.05 0 0.025 0.90 2.5 3.5 12.99 1 100
TABLE II




















































































































































FIGURE 4 - Walrasian and Monopolistic Multipliers for Two Parameter Sets
